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From a Pluralism of Grounds to Proto-legal Relations: Accounting for the Grounds of 
Obligations of Justice. 
 
G Pavlakos, University of Glasgow

 
 
 
A. Outline 
 
The paper focuses on two aspects of Mathias Risse’s paper ‘Responsibility and 
Global Justice’. First, I shall suggest that for his pluralist account of the grounds of 
justice to hold together one need presuppose a monist standpoint which ultimately 
contributes to grounding principles of justice. Second, I will point out that Risse’s 
understanding of obligations of accountability and justification is rather narrow in that 
it functions as an addendum to obligations of justice. To begin with, he presents the 
obligation to give account for or justify our actions to others as one that is added, on 
the side, to obligations of justice. Furthermore, the obligation to give account is, on 
Risse’s view, a special obligation which might or might not materialise alongside 
duties of justice. Conversely, I will suggest that the obligation of accountability plays 
a deeper role:  the conditions that ground it feature at the same time amongst the 
grounds of obligations of justice.
. 
Accordingly, the kind of relation that generates a 
duty among agents to account for their actions must be already in place when 
obligations of justice obtain. Following up on these remarks I will adumbrate an 
alternative account of the relation which grounds (enforceable) obligations of justice. 
 
B. Grounds of justice: from Monism to Pluralism 
 
In the first part of the paper I will reconstruct Risse’s account of the grounds of justice 
by positioning it within current debates in politically philosophy. I shall suggest that 
Risse’s pluralist account poses a challenge to standard views of justice which embrace 
a monistic account of the grounds of justice, but not without itself alluding to a 
monism of sorts. Ultimately my aim will be be to suggest that Risse’s rejection of the 
standard monistic picture of justice relies on two central moral concepts, 
accountability and justification, which create a unified practical point of view, 
through which principles of justice can be grounded. 
 
In respect of the grounds of justice,
1
 Risse argues for a pluralist understanding of 
which he labels ‘Internationalism’. While Internationalism grants particular normative 
relevance to the state, 
                                                             

 An early predecessor of this paper was presented as a comment to Mathias Risse’s keynote lecture 
‘Responsibility and Global Justice’ at the GLOTHRO workshop on Responsibility and Obligations 
from Global Justice, which took place on the 12 and 13 of October 2013 at the Centre of Law and 
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the day, in particular those of Tria Gkouvas, Alexia Herwig, Wouter Vandenhole and Arne 
Vandenbogaerde. The work reported on in this publication has been financially supported by the 
European Science Foundation (ESF), in the framework of the Research Networking Programme 
GLOTHRO. The author would also like to acknowledge the financial support of the Grant Agency of 
the Czech Academy of Sciences through a project on ‘The Role of the Principle of Proportionality in 
the Decision-making Process of Courts’ (grant ID: 15-23955S). 
1
 I will be discussing obligations of justice as part of a wider genus of obligations, namely political 
obligations. As such I consider all enforceable obligations that pertain among agents who are related in 
 2 
 
[…] it qualifies this relevance by embedding the state into other grounds that 
are associated with their own principles of justice and that thus impose 
additional obligations on those who share membership in a state (Risse 2016, 
p xxxx). 
 
Internationalism offers a refreshing take on the recent debate on global justice: while 
most of the recent theories display a monistic flavor Risse proposes pluralism with 
respect to the grounds of principles of justice.
2
 To appreciate the novelty of Risse’s 
account we must turn briefly to the discussion on the grounds of justice within 
contemporary political philosophy. 
 
Instructively, we can illustrate the search about the grounds of global justice as 
involving two kinds of query: a question about the site and another concerning the 
scope of principles of distributive justice (Abizadeh 2007). Considerations of site 
relate to those single properties which are present when principles of justice are at 
work; In contrast, the scope of justice refers to the range of persons that are 
reciprocally connected (be it as addressees or issuers) though claims of justice. The 
question about the grounds of justice involves considerations of both site and scope. 
Yet, the picture we get with respect to the grounds, on which principles of justice rest, 
depends crucially on the emphasis one places on either site or scope. I shall suggest 
that Risse’s account  
 
Accordingly, someone who takes considerations of site to determine the grounds of 
justice, is usually bound to end up with a monist picture of grounding: any properties 
(whatever those may turn out to be) which obtain when principles of justice are at 
work, are assumed to count as existence conditions of the principles of justice. 
Accordingly, any arrangement that does not instantiate those properties falls outside 
the purview of justice.  Hence, the question of site – as one asking about the existence 
conditions of justice-principles – becomes, on this conception, antecedent to the 
question of scope, that is, the question about the range of persons who have claims 
upon and responsibilities to each other, arising from considerations of justice 
(Abizadeh 2007, 323). To judge whether an agent has a standing in justice, we must 
ascertain whether the existence conditions of justice have been fulfilled in the 
particular situation, antecedently to what agents owe to each other. 
 
This understanding of the relation between site and scope leads to a monist theory of 
grounds of justice, which seems to be the dominant position in the current debate on 
global justice. As Risse observes, the major rivals in the debate of global justice – 
relationists (be they statists or globalists) and non-relationists – share the same 
fundamental view: that there exists only one single ground of justice (the one that is 
favored by each). Along these lines relationists assume that the site of justice requires 
the existence of a certain essentially practice-mediated relation (Risse 2016, XXX); 
conversely, non-relationists account for principles of justice without recourse to such 
                                                                                                                                                                              
the special manner we call political. Political obligations typically comprise obligations of distributive 
but also corrective justice. Risse seems to accommodate this point in claiming that most justice 
relations can be re-described appropriately as distributive (Risse 2016, XXX). 
2
 Risse speaks more abstractly of grounds of justice. I prefer to link grounds to principles of justice, in 
order to reflect more accurately the fact that what is grounded are principles, rather than sets of 
principles or justice as a whole. 
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relations – in their case the relevant site comprises properties that are shared by all 
members of the global population, independent of whatever relations they happen to 
be in (Risse 2016, XXX). 
 
Contrariwise, one may have good reasons to start the inquiry with the scope of 
obligations of justice.
3
 It is actually a substantive question whether two agents stand 
in a relation of justice, one that is not exhausted by the obtaining of any singular 
property (or sets of properties) in the static/monist manner we encountered earlier. 
Along these lines, site should not be understood as listing existence conditions but 
merely enabling or instrumental conditions. Enabling conditions of justice are 
conditions which are necessary merely for the realization of obligations of justice but 
do determine their existence. Rather, what determines the existence of obligations of 
justice is the antecedent assessment that a particular normative relation obtains among 
a number of agents. It is then the scope of that normative relation which functions to 
demarcate the site of justice, rather than the other way round. Consequently the 
question about the site of justice is downgraded to a question about the appropriate 
kind of institutional arrangements, which must be put in place in order to realize a 
particular type of normative relation.
4
 
 
Phenomena, which we categorize under the heading of globalisation, have taught us 
that it is very difficult to formalize the grounds of justice into sets of criteria that can 
generate some invariable formula about what counts as a site of justice, which extends 
across all conceivable contexts. This shows quite well in respect of statist views about 
site: 
 
At a time when states share the world stage with a network of treaties and 
global institutions, philosophers have had to consider not only whether the 
state can be justified to those living under it but whether the whole global 
political and economic order consisting of multiple states and global 
institutions can be justified to those living under it. And in a world in which 
the most salient inequalities are not within states but among them, 
philosophers have had to broaden their focus for justice, too, asking not only 
what counts as a just distribution within the state but also what counts as a 
just distribution globally (Risse 2016, XXXX). 
 
This result can be generalized into arguing that there is no single site (justice 
relationship or justice-conducive property) which any two individuals either 
instantiate or do not instantiate. Pace Risse: “One may use ‘principles of justice’ as a 
collective term for different principles with their respective ground and scope” (Risse 
2016, XXX).
5
 Along these lines Risse proposes his own graded internationalism, that 
                                                             
3
 Abizadeh points out that the thesis that the scope of principles of justice coincides with their site does 
not enjoy the status of an analytic truth but is in need of further substantive argument in order to be 
established  (Abizadeh 2007). 
4
 The advantage of putting things this way is that the account tallies better with our intuition that 
questions of justice are ‘practical’ and, hence, must be determined not by some agency-independent 
properties, but by agency-relevant considerations about what is right or just to do with respect to the 
effects of our actions on others. 
5
 However Risse awards the state normative primacy: “I, for one, have accounted for the state’s 
coerciveness in terms of legal and political immediacy. The legal aspect consists in the directness and 
pervasiveness of law enforcement. The political aspect consists in the crucial importance of the 
environment provided by the state for the realization of basic moral rights, capturing the profundity of 
this relationship. However, assuming that something like my account succeeds in explaining what is 
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is, the view that holds “that different principles of justice apply depending on the 
associational (i.e., social, legal, political, or economical) arrangements […] Graded 
internationalism allows for associations such as the WTO, the European Union, or the 
global order as such to be governed by principles of justice, but endorses the 
normative peculiarity of the state. Among the principles that apply within other 
associations we find weakened versions of principles that apply within states.” (Risse 
2016, XXXX) 
  
With the introduction of non-monism Risse suggests we take seriously the idea that 
some grounds could be relational, whereas others would not be. “We must consider 
the possibility that there is no deep conflict between relationism and nonrelationism.” 
(Risse 2016, XXX) As a result, graded Internationalism offers one way of preserving 
the plausible aspects of nonrelationism, globalism, and statism. (Risse 2016, XXX)  
 
The non-monist graded view leads to an introduction of pluralist grounds of justice. 
This comes with a more nuanced range of relations between the dimension of site and 
scope of principles of justice: principles with different scope may be instantiated in 
the same or overlapping sites, thus claiming their application concurrently rather than 
exclusively. Further, it turns out that we do not need to adopt an all or nothing attitude 
with regard to the validity of principles of justice: while the site-based monistic 
analysis would tend to generate one-to-one correspondences between site and grounds 
it turns out, on the pluralist account, that several grounds may lay a claim to validity 
over the same site.  
 
Notably, Risse discusses five grounds for principles of justice: 
 
I recognize individuals as human beings, members of states, co-owners of the 
earth, as subject to the global order, and as subject to a global trading system. 
For common humanity, the distribuendum – the things whose distribution 
principles of justice are concerned with -- is the range of things to which a 
certain set of natural rights entitles us; for shared membership in a state, it is 
Rawlsian primary goods (rights and liberties, opportunities and powers, 
wealth and income, and the social bases of self-respect – all those things that 
people collectively bring about within a state); for common ownership of the 
earth, it is the resources and spaces of the earth; for membership in the global 
order, it is again the range of things to which a set of rights generates 
entitlements; and for subjection to the global trading system, it is gains from 
trade (Risse 2016, XXX). 
 
Those may relate to one another in an overlapping manner. Risse talks in this case 
about embedded grounds: 
 
Let us say that ground G is embedded in H if the individuals in the scope of 
G are also in the scope of H (Risse 2016, XXX). 
 
                                                                                                                                                                              
morally special about shared membership in states, one must still wonder whether this account matters 
for justice, that is, can explain why principles of justice apply only among those who share a state. That 
is the point that globalists push at that stage of the debate.” I do agree that shared membership at the 
level of the nation state is an instance of the justice-ration, but am more skeptical about Risse’s 
grounding of his claim that shared membership constitutes a distinct ground of justice. 
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In introducing the relation of embeddedness, Risse aims to tackle the question about  
concurrent obligations that  lay claims on institutions: 
 
First, we find the ground G most closely linked with the institution (in this 
case, the ground of state membership). A ground is “linked” with an 
institution if the operations of the institution are primarily directed at, or 
most directly affect, the people in the scope associated with that ground. For 
instance, the operations of a state (or its government) are primarily directed 
at members of that state. We ask then what principles are associated with 
that ground, where a principle is associated with a ground if it either arises 
from the ground in the familiar way (e.g., as the Rawlsian principles arise 
from the ground of state membership) or arises from another ground in 
which the first ground is embedded. So this sense of a principle’s being 
associated with a ground is broader than what we are familiar with. Then we 
apply this rule: An institution has duties corresponding to all principles 
associated (in the broader sense) with the ground linked to the institution. 
This approach to deciding which principles an institution has duties to try to 
bring about is more restrictive than the view that entities with obligations of 
justice are responsible for all principles. States, for instance, have no 
obligations relating to Rawlsian principles in other states or, say, principles 
applying to people on another planet (Risse 2016, XXXX). 
 
There are several challenges arising for the pluralist picture: instructively, Risse 
suggests that the grounds of justice are pluralistic. He shows plausibly that justice is 
owed on many levels and in different configurations for different reasons. But what 
precisely is pluralistic about the grounds of justice? For a start, the site of justice: this 
is activated irrespective of state boundaries or only because of a property that pertains 
to the agents involved (for instance, humanity). But also the scope seems to be 
pluralistic: if the site of justice is non-monotonic then it ceases to be an existence 
condition and instead becomes merely an enabling one. As a consequence, one can 
detect more kinds of site that can ground claims of justice. Thus, in one sense, Risse is 
absolutely right to argue for a pluralism of grounds; what determines the grounds of 
justice is the domain of justice, and that domain can be explained independently of 
any fixed formulas that are employed by the standard picture of justice. 
 
However, there is another sense, in which the pluralism of justice becomes less 
attractive. The relevant worry is about the thing which makes all the domains of 
justice domains of the same subject-matter (i.e. justice). How come Risse’s pluralism 
of grounds does not collapse into the fragmented accounts offered by either the 
relationist or the nonrelationist theorists of justice? Further, the difficult question 
about what makes commensurable the various domains of justice?
6
 Risse needs to say 
something more in order to keep his pluralism of grounds immune; for otherwise his 
pluralism will cut much deeper that he intends or his account could handle.
7
 
                                                             
6
 My concern would seem also to bear on the plausibility of Risse’s idea of the embeddedness of 
grounds of justice. To spell the worry out:  Assuming two different grounds G1 and G2, for G1 to be 
embedded in G2, they must both be types of the same kind of ground. It seems to me that Risse’s 
pluralist account can at most guarantee that G1 and G2 are normative grounds, but not that they are 
both grounds of justice. For the latter to be true Risse must also show that there is some overarching 
relation of justice that explains the unity amongst its plural instantiations (see section D, this paper). 
7
 In this context the debate on constitutional pluralism in the EU is instructive: constitutional pluralists 
often face the challenge to account for the coherence of the system of obligations within the EU legal 
 6 
 
More crucially there is a deeper challenge to Risse’s account, one that arises when 
considerations of scope take over from considerations of site: there the focus of the 
inquiry shifts toward such grounds of justice as are capable of explaining claims and 
demands of responsibility that are reciprocally directed amongst agents (Abizade 
2007). Notably this shift of focus is practical in the sense that it moves one away 
from lists of existence conditions toward substantive, agency-oriented considerations 
that identify reasons for the evaluation of actions in the relevant contexts of appraisal. 
To that extent, there is a sense in which the determinants of the grounds of justice are 
invested in claims that originate in anyone whose agency is affected by the range of 
actions, which are the subject matter of appraisal in the relevant contexts. 
Accordingly, by bringing the dimension of scope to the fore we discover that what 
fixes the grounds of justice – plural as these may turn out to be – are claims directed 
to actors by anyone who may be affected by their actions. This, as it were, second-
personal dimension plays a crucial role in determining the grounds of justice. Further, 
it constitutes the normative standpoint through which states of affairs in the world 
become salient for justice and through which we get to identify relevant grounds of 
justice. Yet, no sooner has the standpoint of scope become salient than a minimal 
content of monism has been re-imported into our account of justice. 
 
One might argue, in a pragmatic spirit, that the normative standpoint I am trying to 
import is no other than the rather abstract idea that to make sense of normativity one 
needs to take on board the capacity for agency. But that idea, in its general 
formulation, is rather uninformative and can do little to usefully illuminate the 
grounds of justice. Instead, the skeptic would submit, we’d better get down to real 
work rather than waste time with lofty meta-ethical enquiries. To assert that would be 
surely misleading. The second-personal standpoint I am discussing makes itself 
manifest in none other than the ideas of justification and account-giving which Risse 
takes to be essential supplements of justice-based responsibility, or so I shall claim. 
To that extent my disagreement with Risse is twofold: first, I do not think that 
obligations for account-giving and justification exist merely in parallel to those of 
justice. Rather, I will suggest that such obligations and the claims corresponding to 
them feature amongst the determinants of the grounds of obligations of justice hence 
they are part and parcel of the latter. Second, I will propose that the origins of 
accountability and justification are moral
8
 through and through and do not depend – 
although may be enhanced plausibly – by either special relations (e.g. the relation 
between agent and principle) or systems of independent norms, contrary to what Risse 
argues (Risse 2016, XXX). 
 
All in all, in what follows I shall argue that Risse has downplayed the importance of 
obligations of justification and accountability and their role in the normative structure 
of justice. More importantly so, the way in which we understand accountability and 
justification is key not only to our seeing that justice has plural grounds, but also in 
understanding how those grounds are activated and managed within multi-layered 
structures of political governance (see also Pavlakos 2012; 2015). 
 
C. The Role of Justification 
                                                                                                                                                                              
order. For a masterly discussion of the matter see (Kumm 2012), who however, tends to downplay the 
role of principles of distributive justice as grounds of EU legal obligations. 
8
 ‘Moral’ here is intended to refer to political, not personal, morality. 
 7 
a. The content of duty of justification 
In the last part of his paper Risse argues that in addition to obligations from justice 
there exist obligations of account-giving and justification
9
 (Risse 2016, XXXX). I 
shall turn next to this aspect of responsibility within his account and discuss it in three 
steps: first the condition that account-giving ought to be actual, that is, self standing 
as opposed to being grounded on the same principles that generate duties in justice; 
second, I shall discuss more explicitly his views on what grounds accountability; 
finally, I will comment on the effectiveness of obligations of account-giving. 
To begin with Risse requires that an obligation for account-giving be actual. It is only 
then that agents stand in an accountability relationship for, otherwise, the mere 
existence of duties (of justice) does not imply account giving in that domain: 
 
For any entities A and B that are capable of having obligations, A is 
accountable to B for activities in domain Δ if and only if A (morally or 
legally) owes B an actual justification for A’s activities in Δ. In that case, A 
and B stand in an accountability relationship. The emphasis on actual 
reason-giving is essential to accountability. If A has a duty to B in some 
domain, A does not automatically owe B an actual justification of A’s 
activities in that domain. For cases in which we want to say that an actual 
justification is owed we must argue for that view separately. (Risse 2016, 
XXX) 
 
Risse seems to conceive of the accountability relationship in a manner one could call 
one-sided or static. This is to say that obligations of justification, to which the 
accountability relationship gives rise, obtain for the actor irrespective of the 
standpoint of the addressee (or claimant).
10
  There is nowhere to be found any 
mention to the normative claims addressees have over actions that interfere with their 
agency. Actors incur obligations of justification on a number of grounds in addition to 
the duties of justice in whose purview those agents act.
11
 As a result any claim to 
justification that addressees might have is acquired only ex post facto, that is, only 
after the actor’s duty has been ascertained. Consequently such claims are presented as 
products of the existence of the duty, not conditions of its existence. 
 
Yet this sounds counterintuitive for at least two reasons: To begin with, it implies that 
that which grounds duties of justice and that which grounds duties of justification are 
disparate items.
12
 More detrimentally so, if one were to take the details of Risse’s 
account at face value, none of the aforementioned grounds would be related to the 
(second-personal) perspective of the addressee. However, notice that were we to 
                                                             
9
 I will treat justification and accountability as being, more or less, equivalent concepts. Risse 
distinguishes between them in taking obligations of justification to ground accountability relations 
among agents. For the purposes of my discussion nothing turns on that distinction. 
10
 Risse in fact introduces certain conditions that depend on the standpoint of the addressee, but only 
when he discusses the effectiveness of the accountability relation: “Regarding B, the account recipient: 
B (c) has the knowledge and competence to judge A’s actions in domain Δ; and (d) can impose 
sanctions to penalize A if A falls short of B’s expectations on actions in Δ (or to reward A if A meets 
or exceeds expectations)” (Risse 2016, 17). 
11
 Risse enumerates three such grounds (which he labels ‘origins’):  principle-agent relations; 
independent norms and moral duty on the basis of pre-existing principles of justice. It is only the latter 
instance that explicitly involves the standpoint of the addressee. While Risse takes this case to be one 
amongst many, I shall argue that it is central for the grounding of obligations of justification. 
12
 Compare with n 4, this paper. 
 8 
condone such a conclusion, we would end up with an account of obligations of justice 
that are void of any power on behalf of the claimant to sanction the duty bearer. And 
yet it would seem that such power is central to obligations of justice as opposed to 
other moral duties, which do not allocate such powers to claimants. In fact Risse 
himself is eager to distinguish obligations of justice from other moral duties on the 
basis of their power-conferring capacity. In his words: “One might say professors owe 
students fair grades, but this does not mean students should be empowered to sanction 
them if they fail their expectations” (Risse 2016, 20). 
 
I will coin the term enforceability to characterize the power-conferring capacity of 
obligations of justice. Here is what I have in mind: obligations of justice are 
enforceable in the sense that the right-holder has a claim vis-à-vis the duty-bearer that 
she abide by the relevant course of action or that she be made to perform some other 
action/omission for failing to uphold the required action. Here the claim of the right-
holder is part of the content/meaning of the obligation, which makes it the case that 
there arises an authorization or ‘standing’ over the duty-holder’s agency that she be 
made to do as the obligation says. That is to say, the precise meaning of any such 
obligation is ‘you ought to F and can be made to F’.13 
 
Now suppose, for the sake of demonstration, that I pass on to someone false 
information in the context of a promise or, more broadly, some other assurance-
evoking exchange: e.g. I indicate to Mary that she can have my car tomorrow in order 
to pick up her friend from the airport, but proceed to give my car to John instead. My 
obligation to Mary is enforceable, for part of its content is that I be made to comply 
with it, irrespective of whether I am motivated (intend, and so on) to do so or not. 
This case can be helpfully contrasted with one of a purely moral, non-enforceable 
obligation: Take a general obligation not to lie: suppose I am boasting to someone 
about being very prominent in some way (say, in being on first name terms with 
President Obama). Should it turn out that I am lying, the other person may think ill of 
me or pass negative judgment about my character. However, there is no ground to 
suggest that they have a claim that I retract my lie or that I otherwise compensate 
them for having lied to them. As a result enforceability, in the sense presented here, 
sets apart a relevant class of obligations from other moral obligations which in a first 
instance are owed merely unilaterally. It turns out that what explains, in Risse’s 
example, why the student does not have a claim to any particular mark is the lack of a 
claim to justification which in turn signals the absence of an enforceable duty of 
justice. 
 
A plausible reconstruction of the grounds of justice, one that could accommodate the 
second-personal standpoint of the addressee and the concomitant idea of 
enforceability, would involve the inclusion of claims of account-giving or justification 
as determinants of the grounds of obligations in justice. This would lead to an 
understanding of duties of justification as being more basic or antecedent to 
obligations of justice. But for that to work Risse’s account of the grounds (or origins) 
of duties to justification would need to be revisited. 
 
                                                             
13
 Enforceability, in the sense explained here, must be sharply distinguished from enforcement. The 
latter comprises merely the actual capacity of institutions to impose sanctions on agents. As such 
enforcement is not conceptually necessary for enforceability. Conversely, only enforceable obligations 
can be enforced. See for more detail (Pavlakos in print). 
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b. The grounds of the duty to justification 
 
Recall that Risse locates obligations of accountability and justification within an 
accountability relationship. The latter may originate in three domains: 
 
First, A and B may stand in an accountability relationship because A is an 
agent and B a principal who delegates tasks to A […] Second, there may be 
independent norms in accordance with which A must perform. (Risse 2016, 
this journal). 
 
A third origin is added later (under section 8): this includes the moral duty of  
 
[…] agents with duties to help bring about a just world also […] to offer an 
actual justification to the relevant population (Risse 2016, this journal). 
 
I shall focus on the last origin, the moral duty of actors, as I believe that the two other 
origins can be subsumed under it: while they may enhance that duty such sources – 
principle-agent relations as well as independent norms – need to be based on it.14 
Risse offers two arguments for the moral duty: the first is an argument from respect; 
the other is instrumental in nature: that is, if duties of justice are also coupled with a 
duty to justification, the likelihood increases that agents will be more observant to the 
former. Neither of the above is satisfactory in my view. 
 
I think his account gets the moral duty to justification the wrong way round: duties to 
justification are better conceived of as themselves determining the grounds (and 
allocation) of duties of justice. In addition, while respect is an aspect of the duty to 
justification (in fact one that contributes to its fundamentality) there is nothing 
instrumental to that duty, as Risse would have us believe. Moreover, duties to 
justification do not arise because we have duties in justice plus we ought to respect 
others (justice + additional moral duty to respect). It is rather the other way round: 
respecting others – those whose agency we engage through our actions – is 
manifested by the fact that we owe justification to them, through offering appropriate 
reasons. 
 
To bring out my point more vividly let me gesture at an alternative picture, one that 
takes the duty to justification to determine the relevance of obligations of justice for 
particular contexts. Consistently with a ‘scope’ oriented search for grounds of justice, 
as the one suggested earlier,
 
the account I am favoring is interested in such grounds 
that generate obligations of justification in contexts which relate two or more agents 
to one another. While the context may vary from occasion to occasion (and with it 
also the relevant grounds of justice) the duty to justification must remain constant, in 
representing the standpoint from which the question of justice makes sense in the first 
place. Crucially, on the alternative proposed here, the fundamental role of justification 
and account-giving is accounted for by a relational structure within which the claims 
of the addressee determine the grounds of the obligations that pertain to the actor. In 
this manner the relation of justification is shown to be at the heart of second-personal 
conceptions of obligation and responsibility.
15
 
                                                             
14
 I cannot argue for that view here, but want to believe that it is reasonably plausible. 
15
 Further it is only such conceptions that can offer a satisfactory scope-focused (as opposed to site-
focused) account of the grounds of justice. 
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A far-reaching formulation for characterizing the relevant relation of justification has 
been alluded to by AJ Julius in a series of important recent writings (Julius 2007; 
2013a; 2013b). On his proposal relations of justification, of the kind we are interested 
in, obtain when an agent A has the capacity of directing the agency of some agent B. 
When this is the case then something along the lines of principle C is triggered off: 
 
C: I should not (do y, intend by y’ing to bring it about that you do x, and fail 
to believe with warrant that, for some reasons R independent of me, my y’ing 
facilitates your [doing x because you take R as giving you sufficient reason to 
x]) (Julius 2013a, 363). 
 
C is a structural principle which places agents in a reciprocal relation that determines 
the relevant, domain-specific reasons of justice.
16
 Such relations between agents, 
mediated by principle C, may be labeled associative.
17
 Associative relations can vary 
in density and content, depending on the domain of interaction. Accordingly, we may 
experience variations in the subjects and the site of responsibility: whether it is the 
individual, a company, the state, or finally the global community that bears 
responsibility is a matter left to substantive judgment; however such judgment is not 
unrestricted but bounded by the structure of the associative relation which is 
described by C. 
 
Notably, an account of the accountability/justification relation as associative in terms 
of principle C has a further advantage: it accounts appropriately for the fact that 
obligations of justice are enforceable in the sense of conferring power to the claimant 
to sanction the duty bearer. Leaving a lot of detail out, such relations are valuable in 
demarcating the space of political obligations. The idea is simple: political obligations 
(including those of justice) are enforceable associative obligations which arise among 
agents whose interactions make them accountable to one another. 
 
In the light of the above, Risse’s dichotomy between obligations of justice and 
obligations of accountability/justification threatens to obfuscate the two key 
characteristics of political obligations: their enforceability and the fact that they are 
grounded on (associative) relations which place the parties under obligations of 
justification as described by principle C. Elsewhere I have called such associative 
relations, which can give rise to enforceable obligations, proto-legal (Pavlakos, 
2015). I will turn next to adumbrate the idea of the proto-legal relation with an eye to 
an alternative picture which, in my view, does a better job in accounting for the 
grounds of obligations of justice (qua political obligations). 
 
D. Proto-legal relations 
                                                             
16
 Principle C operates in a similar manner to a definite description: To picture the way this works, take 
the case of water. A definite description of ‘water’ would be: ‘water is the odorless stuff that surrounds 
us’. That description helps us pick out the right property in the relevant domain (H2O on earth; or XYZ 
on twin-earth, and so on). 
17
 In employing this term I do not intend a complete correspondence with Dworkin’s notion of 
associative obligations. However, I do intend to suggest similarities with Dworkin’s conception to the 
extent to which Dworkin was using associative obligations to explain the rise of political and legal 
obligations (Dworkin 1986, ch 6; 2011, ch 14). 
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First-off proto-legal relations obtain through patterns of action which engage two or 
more individuals (joint patterns of action). Such patterns are ubiquitous in our lives: 
from cooking or moving a heavy table together to constructing a levee that contains 
the flood or planning the economy of our community, we all become subjects of such 
patterns. Significantly the set of processes which are usefully captured under the label 
of globalisation, have created many new instances of joint patterns of action while 
typically expanding the circle of actors involved in them: parent companies set up 
subsidiary companies in distant locations, which in turn engage with the local people 
through plural and complex patterns of action; immigration policies establish new 
patterns of action that direct the choices of foreign populations; and so on. Crucially, 
in compressing the space between agents, globalisation has significantly contributed 
to transforming many of otherwise ‘unilateral’ choices and actions to instances of 
joint patterns of action. That is to say, globalisation has intensified joint patterns of 
action: not just those that are grounded on some shared intention of the parties 
involved to participate in them (as in the hunting example), but in addition those that 
join together the actions of agents who do not partake in the same intention, in virtue 
of the impact their actions have on one another.
18
 
 
What is the salient normative effect of those occurrences? Joint patterns of action 
impose normative constraints on the agency of the parties involved, along the lines 
that were suggested by principle C earlier.
19
 Usefully these constraints can be 
understood as constraints of permissibility: that is to say, they constrain both parties 
to perform only actions that are permissible within the joint pattern. This applies to 
both types of joint pattern of action – those covered by shared intention but also, and 
more interestingly so, those that join the action of different agents independently of 
their sharing a common intention.
20
 To that extent the constraint of permissibility 
becomes part of or, even, constitutes the normative structure of joint patterns of 
action.
21
 Before I attempt a more detailed formulation of the constraint of 
                                                             
18
 For the standard account of joint action as based on shared intentions see: Bratman 1987, 2009; 
Shapiro 2011. The account of joint action that I adumbrate in this chapter deems the idea of shared 
intention insufficient for capturing joint action. 
19
 See section C.b. this paper. 
20
 Joint patterns of action, in the sense employed herein, include almost any interpersonal activity 
which involves direction of the action of those agents who are involved in it. Patterns that have this 
feature trigger off a principle (principle of exchange), which imposes a constraint of permissibility on 
action-direction. This principle is instantiated by proto-legal obligations, that is, obligations which 
render the relevant pattern of interaction an exchange as opposed to an instance of coercion 
(exploitation, blackmail, and so on).   Very roughly, this view presupposes an account of joint agency 
whose order of explanation is the reverse of the standard view (e.g. Bratman or Gilbert). While in the 
standard picture what con-joints distinct agents is the sharing of an intention (or that plus the normative 
commitments that flow out of it), in my picture agents are conjoined when their actions track a pattern 
of behavior that is individuated independently of the agents’ intentions, through reference to the 
reasons they share. To illustrate the point: on the standard picture two by-passers A and B would have 
a joint obligation to save a drowning child C, only if A and B already shared the intention to take a 
walk together along the bank of the river. On the picture I am endorsing, A and B become the joint 
subject of an obligation because the same obligation to save C applies to both (even if they were taking 
their walk independently of each other). A more detailed account of these ideas at present would 
burden the paper unnecessarily and distract the reader from the main argument. However the interested 
reader should refer to Julius 2013b, ch 9, which, to my knowledge is the most detailed account in the 
vicinity of the view I am defending. I thank an anonymous reviewer for this journal for pressing me to 
clarify this point. 
21
 Although I cannot discuss this further, it should be noted in passing that the normative structure is 
itself grounded on the autonomy of the agents engaged in the joint pattern. The capacity of joint 
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permissibility let me first cast a closer look at the success and pathology of joint 
patterns of action.
 22
 
 
On a good day joint patterns turn out as exchanges between the parties. This roughly 
means that each party engages in the pattern for reasons she has independently of the 
doings and sayings or the motives of the other parties (Julius 2013b). During an 
exchange the parties, in engaging in the joint pattern, help realize the reasons each of 
them independently has. Take for instance the joint action [You drive me to the 
station, I pay the fare] in which we often engage when hiring a taxi. Here the 
passenger and the driver partake in the joint action [You drive…, I pay the fare] for 
reasons each has independently of the sayings and doings of the other.
23
 Alas, good 
days often come few and far between. 
 
On a bad day, the joint pattern fails to amount to an exchange and deteriorates into 
some kind of exploitative or coercive scenario: a clear instance would be something 
like [You drive…, I refrain from shooting you]. But other, subtler instances of 
deterioration come to mind, when for instance the driver is driving the taxi for an 
exploitative taxi owner; here the joint activity between taxi owner and taxi driver 
might take the form [you drive the taxi 15 hours a day and give the earnings to me, I 
let you drive it for 3 more hours in order to make a living]. What makes this activity 
exploitative is the fact that the driver does not have any independent reason to 
perform his part of the joint pattern (that is, to drive the taxi 15 hours for another 
person), other than the fact that the taxi owner has rendered that a condition for the 
driver to earn a living. A more blunt case of exploitation is blackmail: when the boss 
says to the employee [you sleep with me, I promote you] the pattern proposed thereby 
lacks independent justification vis-à-vis the employee who is coerced to perform 
his/her part as a result of the employer’s making it a condition for performing his/her 
part. 
 
Such instances of exploitative action abound in a globalized world. Take for instance 
the practices of transnational corporations, which increasingly vary their standards of 
operation depending on the location of their operations. In particular in the developing 
South corporations often coerce workers to work in deplorable human rights 
conditions, by taking advantage of the fact that their livelihood depends on these 
corporations. Consider a case where a transnational corporation or its subsidiary, is 
the sole employer in a community. Most locals rely on that corporation, for earning 
living wages. The corporation disposes wastes upstream the only source of drinkable 
water. At the same time, it makes clear that any complaint would lead to loss of 
employment. Most employees remain silent of the abusive relationship for fear of 
                                                                                                                                                                              
undertakings for mutual impact on the agency of the parties involved renders them answerable to 
reasons, thus subjecting them to justification. To that extent joint endeavors have a second-personal 
structure in the sense that the parties who engage in them should look to take on board, or respect, the 
reasons of one another, ultimately aiming to help one another to realize the reasons each independently 
has. In other words exchange, not coercion should be the outcome of the joint endeavor. For accounts 
that place autonomy at the basis of joint action in law and politics see Forst 2010; Möller 2012. 
22
 I would not have arrived at this account had it not been for the seminal work of AJ Julius (Julius 
2013a; 2013b). 
23
 Such reasons may be explained either with reference to the reciprocal promises actors make 
(contract) or – on a deeper explanation – the reasons that predate the promissory act (my reason to go 
to place X; the driver’s reason to make a good living and so on). 
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losing their job. Extreme as it may appear, our imaginary example finds support in 
recent allegations of workers who have been coerced to work in deplorable conditions 
in the apparel industry of Bangladesh.
24
 
 
The pathology of coercion/exploitation contributes to an understanding of the salience 
of the constraint of permissibility in the context of joint patterns of action. Let me 
explain how: joint patterns of action succeed (qua exchanges) if and only if they do 
not contribute to the exploitation/coercion of any of the parties involved.
25
 Instead 
cases of coercion/exploitation count as instances of wrongdoing. For the purposes of 
the present discussion a plausible way to understand wrongdoing is through the idea 
of hindrance of freedom.
26
 Under this explication exploitative or coercive patterns 
hinder the freedom of the coercee, in disregarding the coercee’s independent reasons 
for participating in the pattern.  
 
What may count as a hindrance of freedom, on this understanding, is determined by 
the impact it has on the capacity of the coercee to determine her participation in the 
joint pattern according to the reasons she has. Thus any manipulation of the 
environment by the coercer, or any other intervention that modifies the reasons of the 
coercee in a manner that prevents the latter from acting on the reasons she actually 
has, would count as hindrance of freedom (Julius 2013b). If a corporation imposes 
exploitative terms on its employees or otherwise coerces those who live in the 
environment in which it is active, these actions would constitute hindrances of 
freedom, violating the constraint of permissibility of the relevant joint pattern of 
action.
27
 
 
The most important normative consequence of the constraint of permissibility is that 
it requires joint patterns of action to contribute to each person’s acting consistently 
with the actions of others.
28
 Contribution of the required kind takes place when 
patterns of action facilitate exchange and, conversely, hinder coercion/exploitation. 
Patterns that facilitate exchange do so in virtue of certain features they possess 
                                                             
24
 Following the collapse of the Rana Plaza (2013), killing over a thousand workers, the commission of 
inquiry concluded that workers are often intimidated not to expose their condition. I owe the 
construction of the example and further feedback on real-life cases to Tamo Atabongawung. 
25
 Julius requires further that these patterns help realize the reasons of those involved (Julius 2013b). 
We may remain agnostic about this stronger condition for present purposes. 
26
 Wrongdoing is often defined through harm (see for instance the so-called Maastricht Principles on 
Extraterritorial Obligations of States in the area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights). To the 
extent that the definition relies on a standard understanding of harm as reduction of welfare, one should 
caution against it. Wrongdoing does not overlap with reduction of harm so conceived, for wrongdoing 
aims to cover instances of interference with freedom/autonomy which do not amount to any loss of 
welfare (so-called instances of harmless wrongdoing: say, if I avail myself of your car without your 
permission, damage it, and subsequently replace it with a better one, I will still count as having 
wronged you). See for an excellent discussion of the relevant conceptual distinction A Ripstein Force 
and Freedom (Ripstein 2019, 42-50. 
27
 A more specific aspect of wrongdoing relates to the various kinds of means we each use to achieve 
our ends. The use of any material resources must comply with such conditions that ensure that the use 
of, say, chattels and land does not hinder the freedom of others. Notably Kant believes that any 
unilateral use of property that is not based on publicly promulgated rules would count as wrongful 
(Ripstein 2009). 
28
 There exists of course a class of joint patterns of action in which permissibility does not feature 
prominently or at all. Such cases include de minimis infringements or special relations within which the 
hindrance of freedom is justified through some thick moral reasons (special relations such as family or 
club membership). 
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(facilitating features), which are shared by each of them. These facilitating features 
can be formulated through general principles that generate obligations akin to those 
we encounter in precepts of justice. Importantly, everyone who partakes in the 
relevant patterns jointly shares those obligations. 
 
E. Concluding Remarks 
 
Let me take some stock and gesture at a conclusion: my critical reading of Mathias 
Risse’s account highlighted two core features of obligations of justice: their 
enforceability and their associative character. I then suggested that Risse’s account 
falls short of explaining those features and, instead, proposed an alternative account 
which might do a better job. I employed the concept of the proto-legal relation to 
account for the grounds of obligations of justice in a manner that explains their core 
features without generating a dichotomy between obligations of justice and 
obligations of accountability/justification, as Risse’s account does. I demonstrated 
further that the normative environment of the proto-legal relation can account for 
obligations of justice as being jointly shared by every actor who partakes of joint 
patterns of action that trigger off a constraint of permissibility. 
 
If my account were sound, then one major consequence would be that the proto-legal 
relation would take us beyond a site-oriented inquiry that is wedded to states. In its 
place would become salient the normative relation between agents in its own right, 
not through the social facts that determine one version of that relation (i.e. within the 
domestic state). Notably the account would be able to draw the conclusion that joint 
patterns of action plus the condition of permissibility (i.e. the two key ingredients of 
‘proto-legality’) are capable of grounding obligations whose content and normative 
force is not dissimilar to the kind of obligation we usually call legal. Accordingly, it 
would open our eyes to all those other instances of interaction which can generate 
enforceable obligations, a fact that had been obfuscated by the dedication of the 
standard accounts to one specific site of such obligations (i.e. the state). For, in 
disentangling the content of the salient normative relation from a preconceived test of 
site, proto-legality helps us recover the normative space, which is prominent in and 
largely constituted by trans- and supra-national contexts. 
 
In effect, the structure of the proto-legal relation would be able to accommodate 
Risse’s justified demand for a more pluralistic account of obligations of justice 
without loosing sight of the normative glue that renders them types of the same kind: 
that is, enforceable obligations which establish joint patterns of action that enable 
each person to act consistently with the actions of others. Absent such an 
understanding Risse’s pluralism would threaten to cut too deep as to be able to 
generate a shared account of political justice. 
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